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Motivation
• Why infinitely repeated games?
• Why cooperation?
• Why stability?
• Why complexity?
3
Related works and inspiration
Arkady Kryazhimskiy (2014) 
Equilibrium stochastic behaviours  
in repeated games, 2012.  
Main scope: infinitely repeated 
game  of 2 players x N strategies.  
Q: Existence of equilibrium for 
arbitrary subsets of 1-memory 
strategies. 
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How does a tiny change in complexity 
of strategies influence properties of 
the Nash equilibrium?  
Big Question
What would you guess? 
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Strategies and payoff function 
Infinitely repeated 2x2 game. 
Payoff defined as limit of averages. 
Reactive strategies = stochastic strategies 
defined only on the last opponents action.
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Reactive strategies
1st player (rows)
✓
A1A2 B1B2
C1C2 D1D2
◆2nd player (columns)
p1
q1
= P (1st row | last opponent’s action = 1st column)
= P (1st row | last opponent’s action = 2nd column)
= P (1st column | last opponent’s action = 1st row)
= P (1st column | last opponent’s action = 2nd row)
p2
q2
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Complexity of strategies
Increasing complexity in 2x2 repeated games 
mixed strategies in [0,1] 
reactive strategies in [0,1]x[0,1] 
1-memory strategies in 
[0,1]x[0,1]x[0,1]x[0,1]
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Rigorously answered questions
➡Q1. What are all possible pairs of reactive 
strategies leading to an equilibrium?  
➡Q2. What are all possible symmetric games 
admitting equilibria? How common are these 
games?
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Partly answered questions
➡Q3. Are there  new effects of interactions in 
equilibria caused by the increase of strategy 
complexity? 
➡Q4. If we replace reactive strategies with 1-
memory ones, then what  properties of 
equilibria are affected?
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For fixed strategies we observe Markov chain with 
stationary distribution on 4 states of one-shot game
Payoff equivalence
✓
A1A2 B1B2
C1C2 D1D2
◆
s1
1  s1
1  s2s2
Ji = Ais1s2 +Bis1(1  s2) + Ci(1  s1)s2 +Di(1  s1)(1  s2)
Payoffs are Identical to one-shot game with mixed strategies
s1 =
q2(p1   q1) + q1
1  (p1   q1)(p2   q2) s2 =
q1(p2   q2) + q2
1  (p1   q1)(p2   q2)
✓
A1A2 B1B2
C1C2 D1D2
◆
s1
1  s1
1  s2s2
1 2
3 4
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Sets of strategies
➡No Tit For Tat 
➡Noise proof 
➡First round does not matter 
➡Stationary distribution always exists
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0 < pi, qi < 1
Equilibria generated by SD
ai, bi, ci are defined by one-shot game
8>><>>:
q1 =
c2s1+b2s2+2a2s1s2
c2+a2s2
, p1   q1 =   b2+a2s1c2+a2s2 ,
q2 =
b1s1+c1s2+2a1s1s2
c1+a1s1
, p2   q2 =   b1+a1s2c1+a1s1 ,
0   a2(p1   q1), 0   a1(p2   q2),
0 < p1, q1, p2, q2 < 1.
(p1, q1) (p2, q2)and is a Nash equilibrium
(s1, s2)with the corresponding SD if
Theorem
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Examples: Prisoners Dilemma
0 1 s2
1
s1 Any level of C is possible
0 1 s2
1
s1 Red region - both payoffs  are higher than mutual C
Blue region =  
Equilibrium  
Stationary  
Distribution 
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No brain game
Game with Pareto efficient pure equilibria
0 1 s2
1
s1
 Red region = players’  
payoffs > 7  
Blue region =  {all ESD}
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Discontinuous equilibrium regions 
0 1 s2
1
s1
0 1 u2
1
u1
All symmetric Nash equilibria
q1
p1
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Main properties
 Existence of equilibrium in games without mixed 
Nash equilibrium.  
Reactive Nash equilibria yield same or higher 
payoffs for both players than traditional mixed 
Nash. 
 Continuum of equilibria is typical.
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Main properties
 Existence of equilibrium in games with Pareto 
efficient dominant pure Nash (no brain games). 
 Non-symmetric equilibria in games with symmetric 
payoff matrix, symmetric ESD in games with non-
symmetric payoff matrix.
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Attainability sets and  
stationary distributions
All feasible stationary  
distribution for a fixed  
opponent’s strategy 
p1
q1 p2q2
8s2, s1<
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 s2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
s1
AS for 1 player = red line 
AS for 2 player = green line
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Necessary and sufficient 
conditions
Mixed strategies
Mutual indifference
Ji = Ais1s2 +Bis1(1  s2) + Ci(1  s1)s2 +Di(1  s1)(1  s2)
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Comparison
Dutta,P.K. & Siconolfi,P. Presented work
For high discount factor there is 
a simple criterion for the 
existence of Nash equilibrium 
(reverse dominance)
Even for symmetric games the 
corresponding  criterion requires 
much more tedious calculations. 
Reverse dominance is not 
necessary.
Simple lower and upper bounds 
for equilibrium payoffs
There exist equilibria leading to 
higher payoffs than the upper 
bound for 1-memory strategies
Chance to have an equilibrium 
equals to 1/3
Chance to have an equilibrium 
equals to 31/96 (1/96 less)
compare to 24/96 in one-shot game
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Comparison
Dutta,P.K. & Siconolfi,P. Presented work
Payoff relevant indeterminacy  
holds true  
(continuum of distinct equilibrium payoffs)
There is no folk theorem
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